Foreign Exchange (FOREX) Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation
Partial Settlement Amount $2.3 Billion
In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:13-CV-07789 (S.D.N.Y.) on behalf of all Persons or entities who, between January 1, 2003 and December 15, 2015, entered into an foreign exchange instrument directly with Defendant (as defined below), where such persons or entities were either domiciled in the United States or its territories, or if domiciled outside of the U.S. or its territories, transacted FX instruments in the U.S or its territories. FX Instrument includes FX spot transactions, forwards, FX swaps, futures, options, and any other FX instrument or FX transaction that the trading or settlement value of which is related in any way to FX rates. Additionally, eligible class members also include all persons who entered into FX Exchange-Traded Instruments, where such persons were either domiciled in the U.S. or its territories, or if domiciled outside of the U.S. or its territories, entered into FX Exchange-Traded Instruments on a U.S. exchange. FX Exchange-Traded Instruments means any and all FX Instruments that were listed for trading through an exchange, including, but not limited to, FX futures and options on FX futures. Defendants include Bank of America (Merrill Lynch, and Pierce, Fenner & Smith), Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citi, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan, RBS, and UBS, Credit Suisse Group AG, Credit Suisse AG, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd., RBC Capital Markets, LLC, Societe Generale S.A., and Standard Chartered plc. All of the Defendants have settled to this date, except Credit Suisse.
ISDAFIX Benchmark Rate Manipulations Antitrust Litigation
Settlement Amount $504.5 Million
In re ISDAFix Instruments Benchmark Rates-Antitrust Litigation, No. CV-14-07126 (S.D.N.Y.) on behalf of all persons or entities, between January 1, 2006 and through January 31, 2014, who transacted in interest rate derivative or financial instruments related to interest rate derivative benchmark rates directly with a Defendant. Eligible parties include all persons or entities who entered into, received or made payments on, terminated, transacted in, or held an ISDAFix instrument in the above referenced time period. Defendants include Bank of America, N.A., Barclays Bank PLC, BNP Paribas SA, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., HSBC Bank USA, N.A., JPMorgan Chase & Co., The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), UBS AG, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Credit Suisse AG, New York Branch, Deutsche Bank AG, Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, Nomura Securities International, Inc., and ICAP Capital Markets LLC.
LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation
Partial Settlement Amount $590 Million
In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, MDL Nos. 11-MD-2262 (NRB), 1:11-cv-05450 (NRB) et al. (S.D.N.Y.) on behalf of all persons or entities, between August 1, 2007 and through May 31, 2010, who transacted in and entered into over-the-counter financial derivative and non-derivative instruments (defined below) directly with a Defendant. Defendants include Credit Suisse Group AG; Credit Suisse International; Credit Suisse (USA) Inc. (together, "Credit Suisse"); Bank of America Corporation and Bank of America, N.A, (together, "Bank of America"); JPMorgan Chase & Co. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (together, "JPMorgan Chase"); HSBC Holdings PLC and HSBC Bank PLC (together, "HSBC"); Barclays Bank plc; Lloyds Banking Group PLC ("Lloyds); WestLB AG and Westdeutsche Ummobilienbank AG (together "WestLB"); UBS AG ("UBS"); The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC ("RBS"); Citizens Bank of Massachusetts a/k/a RBS Citizens Bank N.A. ("Citizens Bank"); Deutsche Bank AG ("Deutsche Bank"); Citibank NA and Citigroup Inc. (together, "Citibank"); Cooperatieve Central Raiffeisen Boerenleenbank B.A. ("Rabobank"); The Norinchukin Bank ("Norinchukin"); The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd ("Bank of Tokyo"); HBOS PLC ("HBOS"); Societe Generale S.A.; and Royal Bank of Canada ("RBC"). As of this date, Barclays Bank plc, Citibank, Deutsche Bank and HSBC have settled. The litigation is ongoing against the remaining Defendant banks. The instruments include certain interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements and asset swaps, collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, inflation swaps, total return swaps, options and floating rate notes.
Euribor Products Antitrust Litigation
Partial Settlement Amount $491.5 Million
In re Sullivan, et al. v. Barclays plc. et al, No. 13-cv-2811 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y.) on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased, sold, held, traded, or otherwise had any interest in Euribor Products during the class period between June 1, 2005 and March 31, 2011, and were either domiciled in the U.S. or its territories during the class period; or if domiciled outside the U.S. or its territories, you transacted Euribor Products in the U.S., or its territories during the class period. Settlement class members include, but are not limited to, all persons who during the class period traded CME Euro currency futures contracts, all persons who during the class period transacted in NYSE LIFFE Euribor futures and options from a location within the U.S., and all persons who during the class period traded any other Euribor Product from a location within the U.S. or its territories. Euribor Products include any and all interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements, futures, options, structured products and any other instrument or transaction related to Euribor; including but not limited to, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE), Euribor futures contracts and options, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Euro currency futures and options, Euro currency forward agreements, Euribor-based swaps, Euribor-based forward rate agreements; and any other financial instruments that reference Euribor. Defendants include Barclays plc, Barclays Bank plc, Barclays Capital Inc., ("Barclays") Citigroup, Inc., Citibank, N.A., Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. (f/k/a Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A.), Credit Agricole S.A., Credit Agricole CIB, Deutsche Bank AG, DB Group Services (UK) Ltd., HSBC Holdings plc, HSBC Bank plc, ("HSBC") ICAP plc, ICAP Europe Limited, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, Societe Generale SA, and UBS AG. (collectively, "Defendants") Defendants Barclays, HSBC, and Deutsche have settled to this date.
Canadian Foreign Exchange Price-Fixing Class Action Settlement
Partial Settlement Amount $109 Million
In re Canadian FX National Class Action, (Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No. CV-15-536174 and the Superior Court of Quebec, Court File No. 200-06-000189-152) on behalf of all persons or entities in Canada who, between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2013, entered into an FX Instrument directly with any Defendant (listed below); or indirectly through an intermediary, and/or purchased or otherwise participated in an investment or equity fund, mutual fund, hedge fund, pension fund or any other investment vehicle that entered into an FX Instrument with any of the Defendants. The cases in Ontario and Quebec allege an unlawful conspiracy to fix prices in the foreign exchange market (the "FX Market"). Beginning at least as early as 2003 and continuing through 2013, it is alleged that the Defendants communicated directly with each other to coordinate their: (i) fixing of spot prices; (ii) controlling and manipulating FX benchmark rates; and (iii) exchanging key confidential customer information in an effort to trigger client stop loss orders and limit orders. The Defendants' alleged conspiracy affected dozens of currency pairs, including the U.S. and Canadian dollar (USD/CAD) currency pair, which is one of the world's highest volume trading currency pairs. Due to the importance of spot prices, it is alleged that the Defendants' alleged conspiracy impacted all manner of FX instruments, including those trading both over-the-counter and on exchanges. FX Instruments includes FX spot transactions, outright forwards, FX swaps, FX options, FX futures contracts, options on FX futures contracts, and other instruments traded in the FX Market. Defendants include: Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, RBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, Standard Chartered, and UBS.
Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation
Partial Settlement Amount $60 Million
MDL No. 2656, No.1:15-mc-01404 U.S.D. (District of Columbia) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that between July 1, 2011, thru June 14, 2018, the largest airline carrier companies violated Antitrust laws by illegally acting in concert, participating in an alleged conspiracy to fix, raise, and maintain and/or stabilize the price of Air Passenger Transportation Services within the United States, and its territories, in violation of Federal Antitrust laws. The suit claims that the Defendants colluded to limit capacity on domestic flights; resulting in ticket prices that were artificially inflated, and ticket purchasers paid those artificially inflated prices. Defendants include American Airlines, Inc. (Formerly US Airways), Delta Air Lines, Inc., Southwest Airlines Co., and United Airlines, Inc. (Formerly, Continental Airlines)
Liquid Aluminum Sulfate Antitrust Litigation
Active- Settlement Amount TBD
In re Liquid Aluminum Sulfate Antitrust Litigation-Case No. 2:16 md-02687 (MDL 2687)-JLL-JAD (D.N.J.). An antitrust case which is on behalf of all persons or entities in the United States, between 1997 and through February 2011, who directly purchased from Defendants (as listed below) liquid aluminum sulfate. ("LAS") The litigation contains claims against the major manufacturers of LAS who allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to artificially inflate the price of LAS. Additionally, the litigation seeks to ensure that the Defendants do not abuse the public bidding process for their own gains after they allegedly fixed, stabilized, and maintained the price of LAS sold in the United States over many years. The conspiracy forced the payment of allegedly inflated prices for LAS. The Defendants include: 1) General Chemical Corporation; 2) General Chemical Performance Products, LLC; 3) Gentek, Inc.; 4) Chemtrade Logistics Income Fund; 5) GEO Specialty Chemicals, Inc.; 6) C & S Chemicals Inc.; 7) Southern Ionics, Inc.; and 8) USALCO, LLC
Syngenta Corn Antitrust Litigation
Settlement Amount $1.5 Billion
In re Syngenta MIR162 Corn Litigation, No. 14-md-2591-JWL-JPO (D. Kan.) including but not limited to In re Syngenta Class Action Litigation, No. 27-CV-15-12625 and 27-cv-15-3785 (4th Jud Dist. Ct. Minn), In re Syngenta Mass Tort Actions, No. 3:15-cv-00255-DRH and No. 3:15-cv-01221-DRH (S.D. Ill.), Browning v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. et al., No. 15-L-157 (Ill. Cir. Ct.),Fostoria Ethanol, LLC v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., No. 15-cv-0323 (Seneca Cty., Ohio), Michigan Ethanol, LLC v. Syngenta Seeds, LLC, et al., No. 17-29831-NZ (Tuscola Cty., Mich.), Mid America Agri Products/Wheatland, LLC v. Syngenta Seeds, LLC, et al., No. CI 14-32 (Perkins Cty., Neb.),Ultimate Ethanol, LLC v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. et al., No. 48C05-1512-CT-000184 (Madison Cty., Indiana), and TCE, LLC v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., No. EQCV 039491 (Carroll Cty., Iowa). The Court that is overseeing the settlement that covers all of the above referenced cases is the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. Eligible members include: corn producers, grain handling facilities, or ethanol production facilities (in which, in the context of the settlement, means corn produced in the United States, and/or dried distillers' grains ("DDGs") produced from that corn by ethanol production facilities as a byproduct of ethanol production). The above includes any entities who owned any interest in corn prices for sale between September 15, 2013 and April 10, 2018. The suit originated as a result of Syngenta's release in 2010 of GMO infused seed varieties approved in the U.S, but not in China. In 2013, corn shipments by U.S. producers arrived in China, and were rejected due to the presence of the GMO MIR-162, a genetically modified trait found in the seed products. Shortly after the shipments were rejected by China, U.S. corn prices dramatically fell. It is alleged that Syngenta made false assurances about imminent approval of the seed products by the Chinese Government which constituted fraud; thus causing large monetary damages to U.S. producers.
Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation
Active-Settlement Amount TBD
In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, Civil No. 1:15-cv-08637 (N.D. ILL.) and all related multi district litigation. The Litigation is on behalf of all persons or business entities who purchased Broilers directly from any of the Defendants and co-conspirator, or their respective subsidiaries or affiliates for use or delivery in the United States, beginning January 1, 2008 through December 20, 2019. More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that beginning in 2008, broiler chicken producers coordinated their efforts to artificially reduce the supply of broiler chickens for sale in the U.S., knowing that those supply reductions would increase pricing. It is alleged that the Defendants coordinated their supply reductions by sharing confidential information regarding productions with each other, closing plants, exporting hatching eggs, and destroying their breeder hens. As a result, during that time and the due to the manipulation of the market by the Defendants, broiler chicken prices have increased nearly 50%. Plaintiffs contend that a widely used price index, the Georgia Dock, not only may be unreliable, but that broiler producers may have manipulated it to keep broiler prices artificially high. The lawsuit claims that Broiler chicken producers, combined and conspired in restraint of trade, the purpose and effect of which was to suppress competition and allow them to charge supra-competitive prices for Broilers during the Class Period, in violation of federal law. Broilers are defined as chickens raised for meat consumption to be slaughtered before the age of 13 weeks, and which may be sold in a variety of forms, including fresh or frozen, raw or cooked, whole or in parts, or as a meat ingredient in a value added product, but excluding chicken that is grown, processed, and sold according to halal, kosher, free range, or organic standards. Defendants include Koch Foods, Inc., Tyson Foods, Inc., Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, Perdue Farms, Inc., Sanderson Farms, Inc., Wayne Farms, LLC, Mountaire Farms, Inc., Peco Foods, Inc., Foster Farms, LLC, House of Raeford Farms, Inc., Fieldale Farms Corporation, George's Inc., O.K. Foods, Inc., Mar-Jac Poultry Inc., Mar-Jac Poultry MS, LLC, Mar-Jac Poultry AL, LLC, Mar-Jac AL/MS, Inc., Mar-Jac Poultry, LLC, Mar-Jac Holdings, LLC, Claxton Poultry Farms, Inc., Amick Farms LLC, Harrison Poultry, Inc., Allen Harim, Case Foods, Keystone, JCG Food of Alabama, LLC, JCG Food of Georgia, LLC, Koch Meat Co, Inc. Tyson Chicken, Inc. Tyson Breeders, Inc, Tyson Poultry, Inc., Perdue Foods LLC, Mountaire Farms, LLC., Mountaire Farms of Delaware, Inc., Simmons Foods, Inc., George's Farms, Inc., O.K. Farms, Inc., O.K. Industries, Inc., Haff Poultry, Inc. and Norman W. Fries, Inc.
Pork Antitrust Litigation
In re Pork Antitrust Litigation-Civil No. 18-cv-01776 (JRT/HB) (U.S.D. Minn.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that beginning in 2009, the leading pork manufacturers in the United States colluded to fix the supply and market for pork. The antitrust action claims that pork producers, combined and conspired in restraint of trade, the purpose and effect of which was to suppress competition and allow them to charge supra-competitive prices for pork during the Class Period, in violation of federal law. The companies are accused of conspiring and using Agri Stats' provided data to reduce supply and increase the price of pork above market value. The Defendants control approximately eighty percent (80%) of the market for pork. Plaintiffs allege that this market concentration put the pork industry in an "ideal zone for collusion" as Defendants through market domination and contractual arrangements were in a position to manipulate price through an agreement among the relatively few dominant players. It is alleged that not only were Defendants in a position to collude, but also that this unique industry set-up, wherein one company suffers if it unilaterally raises its prices but no companies suffer if they all raise their prices, made such an agreement possible and necessary if Defendants wanted to increase their prices. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants began to discreetly conspire with one another to decrease pork production and/or limit production increases in an effort to raise the price of pork. Defendants carried out this alleged conspiracy in two synchronized ways. First, Defendants aimed public statements at one another emphasizing the need to cut production, which also served to signal each Defendants' continued adherence to the overall capacity. Second, as a means for enforcement and oversight, Defendants exchanged detailed, competitively sensitive, and closely guarded non-public information about prices, capacity, sales volume, and demand through their co-conspirator Defendant Agri Stats. Defendants include: Agri Stats, Inc., Clemens Food Group, LLC, The Clemens Family Corporation, Hormel Foods Corporation and Hormel Foods, LLC, Indiana Packers Corporation and Mitsubishi Corporation (Americas), JBS USA Food Company and JBS USA Food Company Holdings, Seaboard Foods LLC, Seaboard Corporation, Smithfield Foods Inc., Triumph Foods, LLC, Tyson Foods, Inc, Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc.
Beef Antitrust Litigation
In re Beef Antitrust Litigation and all consolidated cases related thereto, including Civil No. 20-cv-001319 (JRT/HB) (U.S.D. Minn.) Civil No. 19-cv-02720 (JRT/HB) (U.S.D. Minn.) More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that beginning in 2015, beef packers coordinated their efforts to artificially reduce the supply of beef for sale in the U.S., knowing that those supply reductions would increase pricing in violation of Antitrust laws. It is alleged that the Defendants coordinated their supply reductions by sharing confidential information regarding productions with each other and closing plants. The Defendants control more than 80% of the market for fresh and frozen beef sold in the U.S. The Defendants are some of the largest meatpacking companies in the world, and the leading processors of approximately $100 billion in annual commerce in the retail beef industry. The suit alleges that the Defendants entered into an agreement to try to fix beef prices. As a result, during that time and the due to the manipulation of the market by the Defendants, beef prices have increased significantly. Plaintiffs contend that beef producers have manipulated the beef markets to keep beef prices artificially high. The lawsuit claims that beef packers, combined and conspired in restraint of trade, the purpose and effect of which was to suppress competition and allow them to charge supra-competitive prices for beef during the Class Period, in violation of Federal law. It is alleged that the largest meat packers had agreed to suppress their processing, leaving those selling live cattle with no choice but to sell their cattle for much lower prices to have them processed. These events occurred on an industry-wide scale, depressing the live cattle prices across the board thus reduced processing created an artificial shortage of beef. This subsequently allowed the packers to be able to charge higher prices for beef as the demand went up, and the perceived supply was low. It is alleged that the beef producers were able to further control the market by selling to each other and were able to enact the scheme by holding frequent meetings about the scheme. Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants shared confidential pricing information with each other, through a third-party application Agri-Stats, an information sharing service. As a result, since 2015 beef prices have been artificially inflated. Defendants include: JBS S.A., JBS USA Food Company Holdings, JBS Packerland, Inc, Swift Beef Company, Cargill, Inc, Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation (a/k/a Cargill Protein), Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., National Beef Packing Company, Agri-Stats, Inc.
Turkey Antitrust Litigation
In re Turkey Antitrust Litigation, Civil No. 1:19-cv-08318 (VMK) (N.D. ILL.), including but not limited to Orleans Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. et al. v. Agri Stats, Inc., et al., Sandee's Catering et al. v. Agri Stats, Inc. et al. 20-cv-2295 (N.D. ILL.) and all related multi district litigation hereto (the "Litigation"), which is more specifically described hereafter. The Litigation is on behalf of all persons or business entities who purchased turkey directly or indirectly from any of the Defendants, or their respective subsidiaries or affiliates for use or delivery in the United States, beginning January 2010 through December 2017. Plaintiffs allege that beginning in 2010, turkey producers coordinated their efforts to artificially reduce the supply of turkey for sale in violation of the Sherman Act. It is alleged that the Defendants coordinated their supply reductions by sharing confidential information regarding productions with each other. Plaintiffs allege that the nation's largest turkey producers colluded to restrain turkey production, knowing that such an artificial supply restriction would lead to higher prices. Defendants together control approximately 80% of the country's turkey market. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that turkey producers acted together to artificially reduce the supply of turkey for sale. Defendants coordinated their supply reductions by sharing confidential production information with one another through Agri Stats, an information sharing service. As a result, from at least 2010 to 2017, turkey prices were artificially inflated. Defendants include Butterball LLC, Cargill, Inc., Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., Cooper Farms, Inc., Farbest Foods, Inc., Foster Farms, LLC, Foster Poultry Farms, Hormel Foods Corp., Hormel Foods, LLC, House of Raeford Farms, Inc., Perdue Farms, Inc., Perdue Foods, LLC, Tyson Foods, Inc., Hillshire Brands Company, Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc. and Agri Stats, Inc.
Butter and Cheese Antitrust Litigation
Settlement Amount $220 Million
In re the Butter and Cheese Antitrust Litigation, First Impressions Salon, Inc. et al. v. National Milk Producers Federation et al, Civil No. 3:13-cv-00454- NJR-GCS (S.D. ILL.), and all related multi district litigation hereto, which is more specifically described hereafter. The litigation is including but not limited to against Defendants National Milk Producers Federation, Agri-Mark, Inc, Dairy Farmers of America, Inc, and Land O'Lakes, Inc, et al. More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that beginning at the end of 2008, that an effort known as Cooperatives Working Together ("CWT") operated a Herd Retirement Program that was a conspiracy to reduce milk output that violated the law. The class is comprised of businesses in the United States that purchased butter and/or cheese directly from one or more of the CWT members including the above Defendants, during the period from December 6, 2008 to July 31, 2013. The settlement allows for buyers who bought butter and/or cheese directly from a National Milk Producers Federation Cooperatives CWT member. The settlement alleges that the Defendants and their co-conspirators, agricultural cooperatives representing approximately 70% of the dairy production in the U.S., conspired to remove milking cows from production for the express purpose of artificially driving up the prices of butter, cheese, and raw milk.
Farm-Raised Salmon and Salmon Products Antitrust Litigation
Settlement Amount TBD
In re Farm-Raised Salmon and Salmon Products Antitrust Litigation-Civil No. 1:19-cv-21551 (CMA) (S.D. FL.), and all related multi district litigation hereto (the "Litigation") The Litigation is on behalf of all persons or business entities who purchased salmon or salmon products directly or indirectly from any of the Defendants, or their respective subsidiaries or affiliates for use or delivery in the United States, beginning July 2015 and thereafter. The case follows reports that the European Commission received information that the Defendant companies operating at different levels of the production and supply chain in the farm-raised Atlantic salmon market; participate or participated in anti-competitive agreements, and concerted practices with price coordination to sustain and increase the prices of Norwegian salmon. Plaintiffs allege that these Defendants formed a cartel to fix and stabilize prices for farm-raised Atlantic salmon entering commerce into the U.S. Beginning in July 2015, Atlantic salmon producers fixed, raised, maintained, and/or stabilized the prices of farm-raised Atlantic salmon sold in the U.S. Also, Plaintiffs allege that conduct includes coordinating sales prices and exchanging commercially sensitive information, agreeing to purchase production from other competitors when those other competitors were selling at lower prices; and applying a coordinated strategy to increase spot prices to secure higher price levels for long term contracts. Therefore, since 2015 farm-raised Atlantic Salmon prices have been artificially inflated. Defendants include Mowi ASA (f/k/a Marine Harvest ASA), Mowi USA, LLC (f/k/a Marine Harvest USA, LLC), Marine Harvest Canada, Inc, Ducktrap River of Maine, LLC, Grieg Seafood ASA, Grieg Seafood BC, Ltd., Bremnes Seashore AS, Ocean Quality AS, Ocean Quality North America Inc., Ocean Quality USA Inc., Ocean Quality Premium Brands, Inc., SalMar ASA, Leroy Seafood Group ASA, Leroy Seafood USA Inc., Scottish Sea Farms Ltd, Cermaq Group.
Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation
Settlement Amount $2.6 Billion
In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation- The litigation seeks damages on behalf of a class of subscribers, along with injunctive relief, that would increase competition in the market for health insurance. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that beginning in February 2008 through October 2020, several of the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) rules pertaining to the use of its trademark unlawfully impeded competition among its Blue members, causing consumers to pay higher rates for health insurance. Plaintiffs alleged that dozens of independent insurers affiliated with BCBS of illegally carving up the U.S. health insurance market into regional "service areas" to avoid competing with one another. Plaintiffs further contend that the insurance group's member companies conspired to limit competition and boost prices for policyholders thereby violating the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws. As a result and based on the merits of the underlying cause of action, a $2.67 billion dollar settlement was agreed to and achieved by the class. (equitable allocation will distribute 93.5% among fully insured class members, and 6.5% among the self-funded class members) The settlement includes all individual members, insured groups, self-funded accounts, and members that purchased, were covered by, or were enrolled in a Blue branded commercial health benefit product, sold, underwritten, insured, administered, or issued by an individual Blue plan during the above referenced time period. The antitrust action alleged that the Defendant BCBSA and its member plans (the "Blues") entered into with Plaintiff subscribers an unlawful agreement that restrained competition between them in the markets for health insurance, and for the administration of commercial health benefits products in the U.S. and its territories, in violation of Federal law. Plaintiffs contend that the Blues allocated geographic territories; limited the member plans from competing against each other, even when they were not using a Blue name, by mandating a minimum percentage of business that each member plan must do under that name, both inside and outside each member plans' territory; and restricted the right of any member plan to be sold to a company that is not a member of BCBSA; and agreed to other ancillary restraints on competition.